Incentive System Evaluation – a Case Study of Coty

Coty is a new position last quarter. As mentioned in my Q3 letter, I think the “system” factor of Coty is very impressive. As an effort to document my own learning as well as knowledge sharing, I here formalize my notes. It’s not intended as a support for my judgement, rather I think it would be beneficial in general for anyone who involves in a principal-agent situation (e.g. board of directors, entrepreneurs, etc.) for designing or assessing incentive systems.

Investing community generally agree that a management with owner mindset is preferred. But how exactly could one evaluate “owner mindset”? One way is to talk to the management in person and make assessment qualitatively, however that’s not possible for all shareholders. CEOs typically are also very good at marketing themselves, which adds another layer of uncertainty. These are the reasons why some investors prefer founder CEOs, who are inherently owners.

Coty’s incentive system has following uncommon designs based on a heavy ownership philosophy.

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Long Term Management Against Long Term Investing? – Thoughts on Activism and Short-termism

Corporate governance is complicated, and I usually don’t like to think too much about it because it’s just hard. However, I recently came across two very interesting and insightful articles, one from Harvard Business Review and the other from Atlantic with conclusion against each other on Activism. I hope this thinking process will be beneficial to me, and to my readers, in building up knowledge base and investment philosophy.


First, let’s go through a quick summary of the articles.

HBR, in their 2017 May-June magazine, published a package of articles titled “Managing for the long term” [link here], with a core article of “The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership” written by two well-regarded HBS professors Joseph Bower and Lynn Paine. The article started with the Valeant-Allergan acquisition drama involving Bill Ackman (by the way, I agree that Valeant was a questionable company which adopted questionable business practices and didn’t create social value. So I am with Allergan and this article on this point), and followed by challenges on the most widely used agency-based model in context of the corporate governance and proposed a new entity-based model which essentially proposes to gives company more discretion (i.e. power) by loosening them from the agent-principal handcuff. A quick summary chart exempted from the article below.


This article is thoroughly contemplated and aimed justifiably at the core issue of the capital market – Short-termism, however may have gone too far to directly link Short-termism to Activism. Thus, I have some reservation on some minor points, mainly due to this linkage (which could be a separate write-up, so I won’t elaborate here), but overall think it’s a great step to tackle such a socially important issue and think this new model may have profound impact on future corporate governance.

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